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I.

INTRODUCTION

HIS past year the Texas appellate courts addressed a number of
unique and interesting issues involving solid waste, environmental
tort actions, hazardous waste permitting decisions, and emissions
from animal feeding lots. The most interesting may be those addressing
property and the way property rights and duties have been affected by
environmental statutes and regulations. 1
II. SOLID WASTE
A.

DEFINITION OF "PROPERTY" EXTENDS TO WASTE FOR PURPOSES
OF TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION JURISDICTION OVER

TRANSPORTATION OF SOLID WASTE

In a case presenting a fascinating review of the meaning of property in
the age of environmental regulation, the Austin Court of Appeals reviewed the ability of the Texas Railroad Commission (TRR) to regulate
the transportation of solid waste.
1. Background

The case was originally brought in Travis County District Court by
Waste Management of Texas, Inc. (Waste Management), seeking a declaratory judgment, and was joined in by various amicus waste transport
1. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Waste Management of Texas, Inc. 880 S.W.2d 835
(Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.).
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parties to challenge the regulatory jurisdiction of the TRR. 2 At trial,
Waste Management argued that the TRC did not have jurisdiction to regulate transporters of asbestos-containing solid waste because such actions
did not constitute the transportation of "property" as that term was contemplated by sections 1(g) and 4(a)(1) of the Texas Motor Carrier Act
(MCA). 3 Alternatively, Waste Management argued that the Texas Legislature's delegation of authority to the Texas Department of Health and
the Texas Water Commission 4 of control over all aspects of the management of solid waste and hazardous waste under the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act (SWDA) 5 indicated that the legislature had approved and
ratified the holding in Moore IndustrialDisposal,Inc. v. City of Garland.6
Moore held that sludge was not property because it had been abandoned
7
and had no value.
After trial of this matter, the district court ruled asbestos-containing
waste was not property under the MCA, and therefore, the TRC did not
have jurisdiction to regulate the transportation of this material and that
the Texas Water Commission (TWC) has exclusive jurisdiction over solid
waste management. Accordingly, the district court ruled that certain
TRC tariffs and regulations did not apply to the transportation of asbes8
tos-containing solid waste.
2.

Waste Constitutes Property under the Motor CarrierAct

The first issue decided by the Austin Court of Appeals is perhaps the
most interesting. The significance of this ruling is that the court concluded that a generator of waste is in essence the "owner" of that property and remains responsible for that waste through transport and
ultimate disposal. The traditional common law and statutory notions of
property were combined with the more recent regulatory requirements
governing management of solid waste to reach this conclusion. 9
In arguing that the asbestos-containing solid waste was not "property"
under the MCA, Waste Management relied upon Moore for the proposition that waste is not property because it (1) has no economic value and
2. Suit was brought under TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004a (Vernon
1986) and TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §2001.038 (Vernon 1994).
3. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 911b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter
MCA].

4. The authority to control all aspects of the management of both municipal and industrial solid waste was delegated to the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, which succeeded to the Texas Water Commission. Act of July 30, 1991, 72d Leg., 1st
C.S., ch. 3, art. 1, § 1.085, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 4, 42.
5. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.001-540 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994)
[hereinafter SWDA].
6. 587 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
7. Waste Management, 880 S.W.2d at 838.

8. Id.
9. It should always be kept in mind that the relevant statutory and regulatory definitions of "solid waste" include non-solid wastes such as liquids and gases. See, e.g., TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(37) (Vernon 1992).
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(2) has been abandoned.1 0 In Moore the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled
the City of Garland did not require TRC authorization to transport
sludge because the sludge was not property and thus was not regulated
under the MCA. 1 The Austin Court of Appeals rejected what it called
the Dallas Court of Appeals' "cursory review" of the case law from various states on this same topic. 12 In performing its own evaluation, the
Austin Court of Appeals determined that it was required (1) to consider
the entire act and (2) to construe it in order to carry out the intent of the
legislature. 13 The first step of this process involved the review of the
plain meaning of the language of the statute. However, the court found
the term "property" to be unclear and certainly not defined under the
Act. 14 Having so concluded, the court sought to evaluate its general
definition.
The definition of "property" is largely a definition of a legal right. The
court was particularly influenced by the definition from Black's Law Dictionary: "the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it,
to use it, and to exclude every one else from interfering with it.' 15 The
court recognized that generators of waste may spend considerable time
attempting to get rid of waste, but still retain the right to exclude others
from the waste and to direct its disposition. In fact, the court noted that
federal and state environmental laws attempt to force these generators to
responsibly direct its disposal. The court cited both the federal
Superfund laws and the SWDA as examples, concluding that the underlying assumption of these laws is that generators have the legal right to
16
direct its disposal.
The somewhat conflicting definitions convinced the court that waste
could be property because it is "an object that one can possess, dispose
of, and exclude others from using; yet the narrower definition, based on
value, does not include waste because it has no economic worth."'1 7 The
court decided that rather than struggle with an unclear definition, it
would look to the intent and purpose of the Act. In the court's view, the
policy basis for creating the MCA was to enhance public safety, to protect
the highways from excess wear and tear, and to limit uneconomic and
discriminatory practices in the trucking industry, regardless of the value
of the material being transported.' 8 Ultimately, the conclusion was that
the legislature did not intend the narrow reading suggested by Waste
Management. Instead, the court reviewed older statutes and court deci10. 880 S.W.2d at 838; see Moore, 587 S.W.2d at 431.
11. 587 S.W.2d at 432.
12. Waste Management, 880 S.W.2d at 839.
13. 880 S.W.2d at 839 (citing Citizens Bank v. First State Bank, 580 S.W.2d 344, 348
(Tex. 1979).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990)).
16. Id. at 840 n.6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988)).
17. 880 S.W.2d at 839-40.

18. Id. at 840.

19951

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1209

sions, concluding that the legislature used the term "property" to differentiate carriers of property from carriers of people.19
The court sought the meaning of property in the context of the purposes and policies underlying the Act. The Act's declaration of policy
identified three major goals: (1) enhancing public safety; (2) reducing
excess wear on the highways; and (3) limiting improper practices in the
trucking industry. 20 Based on these policies, a precise definition of property appeared irrelevant; any material that is shipped, regardless of its
value, could affect or interfere with these stated goals of the MCA.
This conclusion was bolstered by the court's analysis of the regulatory
scheme, the
scheme in place when the MCA was enacted. Under this
21
term property was used to distinguish carriers of people.
Having concluded that the definition of property includes waste regardless of its value, the court turned to the question of whether the legislature acknowledged and ratified the Moore decision in the 1981 and 1991
amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act. In 1981, the Legislature
empowered the then-existing Texas Department of Water Resources to
"control all aspects" of solid waste management, 22 and defined management to include "transportation. 12 3 In 1991, the Legislature empowered
24
the TRC to regulate the transportation of recyclable materials.
In reviewing these amendments to the SWDA and associated legislative history, the court was not convinced that the legislature ratified the
Moore decision. No reference was ever made to Moore. The court believed the purpose of the 1981 amendments was to allow delegation of
the federal hazardous waste program to Texas. 25 Moreover, the court
concluded that the legislature was assigning the state's environmental
agency jurisdiction to regulate the environmental aspects of waste transportation. 26 This environmental regulatory authority was not seen by the
regulate the economic and safety
court as excluding the TRC's power to
27
aspects of solid waste transportation.
Finally, the court supported this conclusion by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission's and TRC's conclusions that the TRC
could regulate solid waste transportation for hire. 28 The court deferred
to the two agencies' interpretations of their respective enabling statutes,
29
holding that the agencies' interpretations were more than reasonable.
19. Id. at 841.
20. Id. at 840 (citing MCA § 22b).
21. Id. at 840-41.
22. Act of June 1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 831, § 3, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 3170, 317273 (codified as amended at SWDA §§ 361.011, .017).
23. Id. § 2, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 3170, 3171 (codified at SWDA § 361.003(21)).
24. Act of May 26, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 303, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1267, 1272
(codified at SWDA § 361.431).
25. 880 S.W.2d at 842.
26. Id. at 842-43.
27. Id. at 843.
28. Id.
29. Id. (relying upon Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.
1993)).
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An alternative argument presented by Waste Management was that the
generators of waste abandoned the waste and therefore the property
ownership was transferred to Waste Management. On this basis, Waste
Management asserted it could not be transporting property "for compensation or hire."'30 It is with this analysis that the traditional, common law
definition of property and property rights conflicted with modern environmental regulation. The court refused to accept that asbestos-containing waste could ever be abandoned - "a generator has a continuing duty
' 31
to see that the waste is disposed of in accordance with the SWDA.
The court did not reach this issue specifically in this case, however, because the contractor called for Waste Management to transport the waste
for the generators. Thus, the court's conclusion can be considered dicta.
3. Analysis
On its face this case appears to only address the mundane issue of
whether TRC tariffs and regulation apply to waste transportation. The
conclusion of the court comports with the federal system in which both
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation have certain concurrent jurisdiction over waste transportation.
The more interesting aspects of the case, however, involve the meaning
of property and the rights and responsibilities of property ownership.
Traditionally, a property right meant nearly unlimited power to use and
dispose of property. As the Waste Management court recognized, at least
with respect to waste, modern environmental regulation imposes a set of
responsibilitiesin addition to those rights associated with property ownership. In many ways, a generator or "owner" of waste has a continuing
duty to ensure safe disposal and liability for environmental consequences
of that disposal. The Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act,32 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 33 and similar state acts like the Texas SWDA impose certain duties and liabilities on waste generators. The "cradle to
grave" regulatory system of RCRA and the TSWDA are designed to ensure that waste is disposed of in an environmentally responsible manner.
Such duties may result in liability many years after the waste is transported many miles from the "owner" of that "property."

30.
31.
32.
33.

880 S.W.2d at 843.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 9620(h) (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1976).
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AGENCY DECISION TO ISSUE A PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT A

COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE INCINERATOR
UPHELD, EVEN THOUGH THE AGENCY ITSELF ASKED THAT
THE DECISION BE INVALIDATED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
OTHER CONTESTANTS RAISED 458 POINTS OF ERROR ON APPEAL

An appeal of a permit issued to allow the construction and operation of

a commercial hazardous waste and solid waste incinerator survived numerous challenges, even by the agency that issued the permit.
1.

Background

In Smith v. Houston ChemicalServices, Inc.34 the Texas Water Commission (TWC) (now the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commis35
sion) issued a permit under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act to
Houston Chemical Services, Inc. (Houston Chemical Services) to construct and operate a hazardous and solid waste incineration facility in
Harris County, Texas near the City of Laporte. The permitting process
was somewhat schizophrenic from the agency's perspective. Initially, the
hearings examiner recommended that the TWC deny the permit, but the
Commissioners disagreed and decided to issue it. After trial, on appeal
to the district court, the TWC changed its mind and sought leave to
amend its pleadings to allow the district court to deny the permit. 36 The
trial court denied the agency's motion and upheld the granting of the
permit.
As with most permitting procedures for hazardous waste incinerators,
this permitting process apparently created tremendous controversy in the
local community. Harris County, the City of Laporte, a local legislator,
and local citizens all contested the permit and filed suit to appeal the
permitting decision. After the trial court affirmed the decision to issue
the permit, the parties filed an appeal in the court of appeals in Austin.
2.

Summary of Decision
a. TWC's Request That Its Own Permitting Decisions Be
Overturned

The first item that the court of appeals reviewed was the TWC's claim
that the district court abused its discretion in denying the agency leave to
file its third amended complaint, which conceded certain of the contesting
parties' claims and asked that the court reverse the permitting decision.
Certain of the contesting parties filed similar points of error.
In addressing this issue, the court ruled that the granting or denying of
a permit is committed to the agency's exclusive executive function, and
such power is not given to the district court on review. 37 The reviewing
34.
35.
36.
37.

872 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ granted).
SWDA § 361.001-.510.
872 S.W.2d at 258.
Id.
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court may remand that decision if it finds sufficient fault with it. Moreover, because the agency did not explain its failure to concede the relevant points before trial, the permitting decision is presumed valid absent
the TWC's explanation of its unusual action to argue it was not valid. 38
Thus, the court denied this point of error.
b.

Absence of Analysis of Effects of Emissions From a Heat Surge
Vent That Would Operate Only on an Emergency Basis

The agency did not require Houston Chemical Services to submit information on potential effects of an emergency heat surge vent that was to
be located on the rotary kiln where wastes were to be burned. The relevant regulation requires that the owner or operator demonstrate the facility or unit will not cause air pollution, as defined under the Texas Clean
Air Act, based on "waste characteristics, emissions estimates, and dispersion modelling."' 39 The TWC concluded that the "fugitive" emissions
would not pose a threat to human health or the environment because the
likelihood of the vent actually opening was so low. Thus, modeling or
other submissions on air emissions was unnecessary. Nonetheless, continuous monitoring, and twenty-four-hour oral notice and fifteen-day written notice were required.
The court of appeals believed that the agency acted properly. It analyzed the relevant rule as having two parts: (1) a substantive requirement
that the unit or facility will not cause air pollution and (2) a procedural
requirement. 40 The court concluded that the procedural requirement was
not created to benefit a party but to aid the TWC's decision-making on
the substantive element. 41 Absent a showing of substantial prejudice to
the complaining party, the agency could relax this procedural aspect of a
rule. 42 The court held no prejudice occurred and overruled the relevant
points of error.
c.

Level of Detail for the Design and Engineering of the Facilities
Submitted to the Agency

Another challenge of the permit involved the level of detail of the engineering and design plans submitted to the TWC. The relevant regulation
requires construction and operations plans be "sufficiently detailed and
complete to allow the executive director to ascertain whether the facility
will be constructed and operated in compliance with all pertinent state
and local air, water, public health, and solid waste statutes. '4 3 The contesting parties challenged the agency's finding that this provision had
38. Id.

39. id. at 258-59 (quoting 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 120.31, 335.367(a)(2) (West 1989),
recodified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.001 (Vernon 1989)).
40. Id. at 259.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 259-60.

43. Id. at 263 (quoting 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.50(2) (supp. 1993) (recodified at
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.50(2) (West 1994)).
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been met because the plans were not construction plans, and one was
44
even marked "Not for Construction".
The court took the contestants' position to be that the plans must meet
the level of detail required for a private construction contract, with each
party to the contract "having a contract right of performance according to
the agreed plans." 45 The court rejected this view and accepted as reasonable the TWC's interpretation of the rule that preliminary plans could
provide sufficient detail to determine if the facility will be constructed
and operated in compliance with relevant statutes. The court further held
that the agency did not interpret this rule to require plans that "would be
sufficient for judging compliance with any contract under which the struc46
tures would be built."
The court then rejected the contestants' claim that the Texas Engineering Practice Act 47 requires that the government "accept" only plans that
meet the construction contract level of specificity and detail. The court
did not believe that the term "accept" had a contractual meaning.
Rather, the court believed that TWC would reserve the right to require
changes in plans because they "are essentially conditional and tentative
and [submitted] only for the purpose of initiating the application process."'4 8 The court held that the permit did not create a privilege or property right on behalf of the permit holder, and is subject to unilateral
orders of the TWC. 49 Finally, the court concluded that the company must
obtain an engineer's certification that the facility complies with the permit and any subsequent TWC orders after construction and performance
of a "trial burn," in which wastes are burned and tests are conducted to
50
measure air emissions and other parameters.
In this author's opinion, the court focused too much on the property
rights of the permittee and whether the plans and specifications created a
binding agreement between the agency and the permittee. The question
was really different. What the agency needs is a set of plans and specifications that will reflect how the plant will be built; absent some change,
the permittee would arguably be bound to construct the facility or unit in
accordance with those plans. At the same time, the permittee would arguably be protected from unilateral changes by the agency without following the procedures for a permit modification or issuing or obtaining
an administrative or judicial order. Some level of certainty is necessary
for both parties, as well as the public, as to what will be constructed. The
court did not adequately address this issue to guide the state, a permit
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

872 S.W.2d at 263.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 264.
TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art 3271a, § 15(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
872 S.W.2d at 264.
The court was apparently referring to the regulations now codified at 30 TEX.ADMIN. CODE §§ 305.122(b), .123 (West 1994).
50. 872 S.W.2d at 264; see 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 305.571(2), (3) (West 1994).
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applicant, or a contesting party as to what level of detail is sufficient to
meet the regulatory requirements.
d.

Allegation That the TWC Failed to Make Findings on All
Requisite Statutory Criteria

The contestants' next most serious technical challenge was that the
TWC failed to make findings on all relevant statutory criteria. The court
recognized that the agency must reach an ultimate conclusion under the
TSWDA that "the applicant has provided for the proper operation of the
proposed hazardous waste management facility." 5 1 The Act also sets out
several general objectives. 5 2 The contestants claimed that the TWC had
failed to make requisite findings on both of these alleged necessary
criteria.
The court rejected both claims. First, it held that the agency made nu53
merous legal conclusions sufficient to demonstrate proper operation.
Second, it ruled that the general objectives of the statute are not required
to be ruled upon in a permitting hearing, are not addressed in the permitting section of the statute, and that no factual issues were raised in the
hearing process so the Agency could not be faulted for failure to make a
54
finding.
e.

Claim That Part of the Facility Was Located in a Flood Plain

The contestants claimed part of the facility, a "Railcar Unloading
Area," was located in a flood plain and that the agency had committed
legal error by not addressing the associated risks. The court concluded
that the only part of the property within the flood plain was a drainage
ditch that the railroad track crossed at the property line. 55 The TWC
nonetheless prohibited the use of the Railroad Unloading Area, unless
the permittees submitted as part of a "major permit amendment" information that shows that the area is outside or can be protected from washout to the flood plain, that proper secondary56containment is in place, and
that it will meet federal location standards.
The court ultimately held that the evidence showed that no operational
equipment or activities would take place in the flood plain. Various dikes
were in place to prohibit a release if a spill occurred or perhaps to reduce
the chance of flooding. The agency also forbade the Railroad Unloading
Facility until further information was submitted upon its location above
the flood line.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 269 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.109(a)(1) (Vernon 1992)).
Id. § 361.023.
872 S.W.2d at 270.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268; see 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 335.152(a)(1) (West 1994).
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f. Financial Assurance Concerns
Concerns with the financial assurance required of the permittee were
raised with the court, but again the agency's action was upheld. For hazardous waste management facilities, an owner or operator must demonstrate the financial ability to close the facility after its active life and to
monitor the facility after closure for thirty years as well as demonstrate
financial coverage for third party property or personal bodily injury arising from the operation of the facility for both sudden and nonsudden
accidental occurrences.5 7 The court and apparently the contestants believed these requirements had been met.
The contestants claimed, however, that Houston Chemical Services
failed to demonstrate that it had sufficient financial wherewithal to operate the facility. Section 361.085 of the SWDA in subsections (a) and (d)
make statements the contestants cited in this regard. The court concluded that the statute distinguishes between closure and operations of
the facility and that separate mechanisms could be used for each.5 8 The
court also stated that the closure cost estimate had to be based on the
period during the active life of the facility when closing the facility would
be most expensive, therefore taking into account operations.5 9 The use of
liability insurance also indicated financial ability to operate the plant
properly. 6° This author notes that the ability to finance damages from
improper operationswould seem to be different from the ability to properly operate the facility to avoid those damages; the court seemed confused about the regulations and the financial requirements imposed upon
facilities.
The contestants also complained that the TWC did not demonstrate
the specific level of risk that financial assurance should cover, but used
the standard regulatory amounts, and did not select the financial mechanisms from the list in the regulations that the permittee could utilize. The
court found this approach reasonable. 61 The author contends this was
appropriate. The ability to adjust the amount of financial assurance and
to do so based on site-specific risk is a discretionary ability. EPA and
state agencies can rely upon and generally do rely upon the standard
amounts found in the federal regulations. With respect to the type of
mechanism to meet these requirements, the court indicated that the
agency had made a selection.62 In this regard, the court may have erred
by stating that the discretion lies with the agency in determining what
financial mechanism may be used. The federal regulations adopted by
57. Id. at 260; see 40 C.F.R. § 264.142-.147 (1992); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
58. 872 S.W.2d at 262.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 262-63.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 263.
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reference allow the owner or operator to choose from among the list of
63
accepted mechanisms.
g. Various Other Legal and Procedural Challenges to the Agency's
Action
A variety of legal and procedural challenges were lodged in the numerous points of error filed with the court of appeals. The contestants believed, based on a Commissioner's statement that he needed to see the
results of the "trial burn" to know if the incinerator would work properly,
proper determinations had not been made on the record to support issuance of the permit. The court concluded that the findings of fact and
conclusions of law were the basis for appellate review of the agency decision and that basis supported the permitting decision. 64 Also, questions
asked by one of the commissioners to the staff were not deemed harmful
or a denial of due process because they were not outside the evidentiary
65
record and did not involve grounds for the decision.
The court also rejected claims that the agency failed to make a decision
based on the relevant statutory factors, to identify the legal criteria relied
upon in its conclusions of law, 66 to adopt the hearing examiner's findings
of fact and conclusions of law, 67 to provide proper notice, 68 and to base
its decision on substantial evidence. 69 A variety of other points of error
were denied, including the argument that the commission included posthearing terms in the permit, and that the agency acted in excess of its
authority.
3. Summary Analysis
When considering the 458 points of error raised by the contestants, the
numerous points that the court actually reviewed, and the majority it
summarily dismissed, it appears that the court was overwhelmed with
both the number and complexity of the massive legal assault on the permit. In certain areas the court appeared to be looking for ways to uphold
the permit, perhaps because it thought that the contesting parties were
simply amassing a legal challenge because they did not want the incinerator in their area (the "NIMBY" or "Not In My Back Yard" syndrome).
Furthermore, the agency had taken the bizarre and rare position that its
own permitting decision should be overturned. Clearly, the hazardous
waste incinerator was a highly controversial facility.
63. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.143 (1982) (the owner or operator "must choose from the
options as specified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section").
64. 872 S.W.2d at 266-67.
65. Id.at 278.
66. Id. at 266-67.

67. Id.at 268-69.
68. Id. at 270-71.
69. Id. at 271-73.
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Obviously, the motivations of the judges may be hard to discern. The
court did, however, seem to take a rather deferential approach in reviewing the points of error that made up the challenge to the permit.
III.

COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS

A.

RECOVERY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES UNDER A
NEGLIGENCE THEORY REQUIRES PROOF OF WRONGFUL
INACTION OR FAILURE TO EXERCISE REASONABLE
CARE UNDER RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES

Environmental litigation between current and former landowners,
neighboring landowners, and landlords and tenants has grown dramatically. Last year's Survey reviewed a case in which a tenant sued a landlord for environmental costs incurred to remedy an environmental
disposal site. 70 This year's article reviews a case in which the "table is
turned" and the landlord, rather than a tenant, sued for costs of environmental remediation.
In Sullivan v. Booker7 1 the First District Court of Appeals in Houston
upheld denial of relief to the landlord. The decision hinged upon the
plaintiffs' failure to establish the defendants' breach of duty to exercise
reasonable care.
1.

Background

The landlords brought suit to recover, among other things, environmental costs of $260,000 incurred by the landlords because of leaking underground storage tanks. 72 The tenants had purchased a lease and
improvements on the landlords' land from the original tenant through a
lease assignment and bill of sale. This tenant thereby became the substitute tenant and owner of a closed car wash and two associated underground storage tanks. The tenant vacated the property before the term of
the lease expired, and pursuant to the lease, the landlords became the
owners of the underground storage tanks. Only after the defendants had
vacated the property did the landlords discover that the tanks were
leaking.
After trial before a jury, the trial court granted the tenants' motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for two reasons: (1) the landlords
failed to submit a jury issue on whether the tenant failed to use reasonable care to protect the leased premises, and (2) the tenant did not present evidence to show that the tenant failed to exercise reasonable care. 73
70. Scott Deatherage, Caroline M. LeGette and Lisa K. Bork, Environmental Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1131 (1994) [hereinafter Deatherage, 1994
Annual Survey].
71. 877 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

72. 1. at 371.
73. Id. at 372.
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2. Summary of Decision
The appellate court found the first issue to not be fatal. Rule 279 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where issues are omitted
they are deemed found by the jury if supported by some evidence. 74 In
addition, when the only issue submitted to the jury is damages, omitted
elements are deemed found where the damages relate to only one cause
of action. 75 Reviewing the landlords' submissions, the appellate court
concluded that the issue submitted to the jury only related to negligence;
thus, omitted issues could be deemed found if sufficient evidence was
presented to support those issues. 76
The appellate court concluded that the question of sufficiency of evidence was the fatal flaw in the landlords' case. 77 The cause of action
against the tenant for failure to use reasonable care to protect the premises constituted a claim for negligent waste. 78 The appellate court found
no evidence in the record to show that the tenant's "inaction was wrongful or what actions would constitute reasonable care by a lessee to protect
leased premises in a situation such as this."' 79
The evidence on the record only demonstrated what the tenant did not
do and that the contamination of groundwater arose from the underground tanks. The tenant testified that he
1) did not feel it necessary to conduct an environmental study to
find out the status of the underground tanks,
2) did not take any action to remove the tanks,
3) did not take any action to test the soil or underground water,
4) did not do any testing to determine if the tanks had leaked, and
5) did not take any action at all to protect80the environment in regards to the underground storage tanks.
The landlords offered expert testimony on the cause of the contamination. The landlords' expert testified that testing had been performed on
the premises, that leaks existed in the tanks, and that, in their opinion, the
groundwater contamination originated from those tanks.81
In short, the appeals court ruled that no evidence had been submitted
that the tenant's "inaction was wrongful or what actions would constitute
reasonable care by a lessee to protect leased premises in a situation such
as this."'82 Without such evidence, the appeals court held that the trial
court could not deem the omitted elements of negligence found by the
83
jury under Rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
74. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
75. 877 S.W.2d at 372 (citing Ramos v. Frito-Lay, 784 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990)).
76. Id.

77. 1&
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

877 S.W.2d at 372.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
877 S.W.2d at 372.
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3. Analysis
Sullivan presents an ambiguous holding. The ambiguity arises because
of the somewhat unique facts of the case and the terse rationale for the
opinion. The facts are unique in that the tenant took possession of the
real property with the tanks in place and out of use. Thus, the question of
what reasonable care should have been exercised may have been limited
to a person, in the court's words, "in such a situation." 84 This could be
contrasted with a different case in which the tenant operated the tanks.
The ambiguity could have been removed if the court would have elucidated its opinion. The court, however, only stated that evidence was not
presented on what care should have been exercised without clarifying
whether the duty would differ if the defendant had actually used the underground tanks. Based on the ambiguity, the precedential value of the
case is unclear.
In recent years, the Environmental Protection Agency created regulations governing underground storage tanks. In Texas, this program has
been delegated to the Texas National Resource Conservation Commission, which has promulgated its own underground storage tank regulations. 85 Failure to comply with such regulations may have subjected the
second tenant in the Sullivan case to a negligence per se claim. At the
same time, the landlords would have to have proven the tenant failed to
comply with the applicable regulations. The failure to remove the tanks
and monitor or remedy groundwater contamination may have violated
the regulations since the underground tanks became the property of the
second tenant.
This case demonstrates again how the common law responsibilities for
owning property, here underground storage tanks as opposed to asbestoscontaining waste, have been significantly changed through the enactment
of environmental legislation and the promulgation of environmental
regulations.

B.

ENVIRONMENTAL TRESPASS AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS

Another case decided by the courts of appeals in Texas addressed environmental torts. In City of Arlington v. City of Fort Worth86 the two
cities became engaged in litigation over sludge from a drinking water
treatment plant. The main issue in the case was whether the City of Fort
Worth (Fort Worth) could obtain an injunction to prevent what it contended was the wrongful action of the City of Arlington (Arlington).
1.

Background

The basis of the action was Arlington's continued discharge of water
treatment sludge into Fort Worth's wastewater treatment plant.
84. Id.
85. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 334.1 -. 510 (West 1994).
86. 873 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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The history of Arlington's discharge is long. The only permitted wastewater treatment plant in the relevant region, which includes western Arlington, is operated by Fort Worth. In 1966, Fort Worth and Arlington
entered into an agreement whereby Fort Worth would accept the sewage
from Arlington into its lines and treat that sewage in Fort Worth's treatment plant. From 1966 until 1972, Arlington discharged its treatment
sludge into a creek, at which time the Federal Clean Water Act made that
action illegal. Subsequent amendments to the 1966 contract between the
two cities allowed Arlington to discharge this sludge instead to the Fort
Worth sewage system.
The last decade has not been one of warm relations between the two
cities. Fort Worth attempted to negotiate higher fees for sewage treatment. These negotiations ultimately broke down and Fort Worth notified
its neighboring city that it would not extend the treatment contract beyond its term that ends in the year 2001. Arlington responded by filing a
declaratory judgment action, which it ultimately lost. 87 At about that
time, Fort Worth terminated by notice, as allowed under the amendments
to the treatment contract, Arlington's ability to discharge the treatment
sludge. Arlington continued to discharge and report the amount to Fort
Worth, which continued to bill for the discharge. In 1992, Arlington
ceased reporting, but Fort Worth discovered a few months later that Arlington was continuing to discharge the sludge.
The result was this case. Fort Worth filed suit to enjoin Arlington's
discharge and to recover damages for treatment services unwillingly provided and for payment not received. Fort Worth claimed that Arlington's
discharge of sludge constituted a trespass. The trial court issued
an in88
junction to prohibit Arlington from continuing the discharge.
2. Summary of Decision
In reviewing the standard for granting a temporary injunction, the
court of appeals in Fort Worth stated that such a remedy is extraordinary
and should be carefully granted.8 9 As an appellate court, it determined
that the trial court's issuance of the injunction is an abuse of discretion
unless the applicant clearly establishes that it would be threatened with
an actual, irreparable harm if the temporary injunction were not
granted. 9 0 On the other hand, the appeals court resolved that it could
only overrule the trial court's decision if it constituted a clear abuse of
discretion. 9 1
Having established the proper standard of review, the appeals court
turned to the facts of the case before it. The point of error addressed was
87. City of Arlington v. City of Fort Worth, 844 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1990, writ denied).
88. 873 S.W.2d at 767.

89. Id. at 768.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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whether the temporary injunction maintained or altered the status quo.
The court ruled that the status quo to be maintained is "the last, actual,
peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the suit." 92 The court
identified this status to be the discharge by Arlington before the amendments to the discharge agreement were terminated by Fort Worth. 93 Fort
Worth contended that the discharge was illegal, but the court concluded
that the question of legality was the central issue of the suit. Thus, if a
temporary injunction were proper, this would be the status that should be
maintained by the trial court.
Turning to the issue of actual, irreparable harm, the appeals court reviewed Fort Worth's assertions. Fort Worth claimed that (1) it was not
receiving treatment fees for the sludge, (2) its ability to borrow was reduced, and (3) its sludge drying beds were filling up. As to the first assertion, the court ruled that this matter could be addressed by monetary
relief. 94 The second issue was held to be too speculative. 95 Finally, the
court determined that based on the fact that Arlington's sludge accounted for only 1.2% of the system's total sludge intake, the irreparable
harm issue could not be proved, at least during the pendency of the
96
trial.
Fort Worth argued, however, that a continuing trespass may be enjoined even absent an actual, irreparable harm. The appellate court
agreed that a trespass may occur through allowing something to cross
relevant property boundaries on, beneath, or above the surface of the
earth.97 While agreeing that a permanent injunction may ultimately be
appropriate, the court held that a temporary injunction could only be issued where an actual, irreparable harm is shown. 98 The court ruled that
Fort Worth could be made whole through the award of monetary damages for any injury occurring during the pendency of the trial.99 Thus, the
court reversed the trial court, dissolved the temporary injunction, and remanded the action to the trial court.
IV. TEXAS CLEAN AIR ACT
A.

TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THE ODORS FROM A

CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING LOT MET THE LOCAL
NORMALITY TEST WAS HELD TO BE SUPPORTED
BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

After several years of litigation and appeals, the F/R Cattle Company,
Inc. (F/R Cattle Company) has won decisions holding that the air emis92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
873 S.W.2d at 767.
Id. at 770.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id.
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sions from its concentrated animal feeding lot are not subject to air emissions permitting under the Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA). 1°°
1.

Background

The trial court originally ruled that the lot was normal, usual, and natural for the area and locality and thereby fit within the exception from the
definition of pollutant under the TCAA for "natural processes."'' 1 The
appeals court in Eastland reversed the district court, holding such a concentration of animals was abnormal, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and adopted the legal test utilized by the trial
court.

02

2. Summary of Decision
The issue on remand from the supreme court to the appeals court was
whether sufficient evidence had been presented by F/R Cattle Company
to demonstrate whether (1) the cattle feeding operation was "normal,
odor
usual, and natural for the 'area and locality' " and (2) whether "the
03
vicinity.'
the
for
usual
and
normal
was
facility
the
by
produced
In reviewing the record, the appeals court noted that the facility was
the only one of its kind in Texas, but that it was located near surrounding
dairies and in Erath County where numerous dairies are found. In fact,
these dairies were the source of the calves at the feeding lot and were
returned to the dairies after achieving a given size.
The remainder of the evidence was directed to the similarity and degree of offensiveness of the odor produced by the feeding lot versus the
dairies, and the relative amount of manure produced by the two types of
operations.
The Texas Air Control Board representative and local residents testified that the feed lot produced a much worse smell while the operating
manager of the feed lot testified that the smell from both was equally
bad. A consulting engineer testified that the relative amount of manure
produced by calves at the feeding lot would be about the same as that
produced by full-grown cows at an average size dairy in the area.
The court of appeals on remand was constrained by the supreme
court's decision. The court of appeals had to apply the local vicinity rule.
In applying that legal rule the court was also constrained by the sufficiency of evidence level of review of the trial court's evidentiary decision.
Having reviewed the evidence, the court determined that it was comwas consistent with
pelled to sustain the trial court's ruling that the1.0 odor
4
other odors in the area from dairy operations.
100. State v. FIR Cattle Co., 875 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, n.w.h.).
101. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.003(2) (Vernon 1992).
102. 875 S.W.2d at 736 (citing F/R Cattle Company, Inc. v. State, 866 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.
1993); see Deatherage, 1994 Annual Survey, supra note 70, at 1138-39.
103. Id. at 736.
104. Id. at 738.
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3. Analysis
The ultimate result defies logic. As I discussed in last year's environmental Survey, the result of the interpretation of the term "natural
processes" in the Texas Clean Air Act is that the more human activity
interferes with natural processes, the less likely it will be considered "unnatural" and the less likely the State may be able to regulate the associated emissions or odors under the Texas Clean Air Act. 10 5 The ability of
the State to assist persons aggrieved by odors emanating from dairies,
feeding lots, and similar operations may be very limited. Perhaps, the
ability to bring nuisance actions will allow such persons at least some
legal recourse against the parties responsible for the odors.
V. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in this year's Survey raise various interesting points
interpreting both statutory and common law issues governing protection
of the environment. The most interesting is perhaps the discussion of the
definition of property in the Moore case as it relates to the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Texas Railroad Commission. 10 6 The outcome of the
court's discussion of this issue demonstrates that property in a modern
society connotes not just "property rights" but also "property responsibilities." This is particularly interesting at a time when public commentators
and politicians speak of the "Property Rights Movement." The reality
may well be that rights associated with property must be protected, yet
the responsibilities associated with that ownership must be enforced.
This conflict is most clearly illustrated by the Houston Chemical Services case and the FIR Cattle Company case. 10 7 In the former case, residents and local cities were fighting the permitting of a solid and
hazardous waste incinerator. In the latter case, the Texas Air Control
Board was attempting to regulate the odors of a cattle feeding lot and its
impact on the local residents. The other two cases discussed in this year's
Survey involve common law claims by parties who claim others have violated duties to protect them from environmental harm. 10 8
These cases demonstrate how environmental protection is not just protection of nature itself, but the economic interests of others. They also
illustrate that the conflict between protection of one's own rights and
freedoms to use and dispose of property and the duty to ensure that such
action does not adversely affect other individuals or society more broadly
will no doubt continue apace. How this conflict is resolved in particular
cases will provide interesting discussion in this and future Surveys of environmental law in Texas.

105. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

1994).
106. See Part II.A.I., supra.
107. See Parts II.B. & IV.A., supra.
108. See Parts III.A. & III.B., supra.

§ 382.001 et seq. (Vernon 1992 & Supp.

